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“If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a
sound?”
Introduction
Subjective probability quantifies a decision maker’s degree of belief in the likelihoods of
events about which reasonable decision makers might disagree. Borel (1924) and Ramsey
(1926) proposed the key idea that subjective probabilities may be inferred from the odds a
decision maker is willing to offer (or accept) when betting on events or the truth of certain
proposition. Both authors require that the event on which a bet is placed be observable, so that
the uncertainty is resolved and the payments can be affected. In the words of Borel, “I can in
the same way offer to someone who enunciates a judgment capable of verification a bet on his
judgment” (Borel 1964: 57).
To formalize the idea of resolution of uncertainty, Savage (1954) introduced the idea of
state of nature, “a description of the world so complete that, if true and known, the
consequences of every action would be known” (Arrow 1971: 45). Implicit in this definition is
the notion that there is a unique true state that is fully depicted by the consequences associated
with every possible action. In practice, however, decision theorists and economists routinely
specify a state space as a primitive constituent of the decision problem. Savage himself applied
this “state-first” approach when he wrote, “If two different acts had the same consequences in
every state of the world, there would from the present point of view be no point in considering
them different acts at all. An act may therefore be identified with its possible consequences.
Or, more formally, an act is a function attaching a consequence to each state of the world”
(Savage 1954: 14). However, treating the state space as a primitive ingredient of the model
tends to conceal critical aspects of the notion of states and imposes tacit and unnecessary
restrictions on its usefulness.
The purpose of this note is twofold. First, it discusses and elaborates an approach to
modeling the resolution of uncertainty described in Fishburn (1970), Schmeidler and Wakker
(1987), and Karni and Schmeidler (1991). Second, it examines the implications of this
approach for the modeling of the choice set in the theory of decision making under uncertainty.
States of Nature
Reality and perception
Albert Einstein is reported to have asked Niels Bohr whether he believed that the moon
does not exist if nobody is looking at it. Bohr replied that however hard he (Einstein) might
try, he would not be able to prove that it does. In other words, following Quine (1948/1949), an
object is a theoretical interpretation of perceived sensory information in order to represent and
understand the environment. In this sense, an object that cannot be perceived cannot be known
to exist and, indeed, need not exist. This concept of knowledge is pertinent to understanding
Savage’s idea of state of nature. To paraphrase the epigram “if a state of nature obtains but
leaves no perceived manifestations, does it obtain?” In what follows I argue that a state of
nature is a perception and that the specific interpretation of sensory information lends a state of
nature its meaning. Moreover, to serve as a meaningful ingredient of a decision model, states
of nature must be observable, in the sense that independent observers must agree on and
communicate what has been observed.
The approach
According to the approach advanced here, the set of states of nature, or the state space, is
constructed using two basic ingredients: a set, A, of basic actions, and a set, C, of feasible
consequences. Basic actions depict alternative, implementable, courses of action; feasible
consequences are outcomes that may result from these actions. A state of nature, s, is a
mapping from the set of basic actions to the set of feasible consequences. The state space is the
set of all such mappings. Formally, the state space is CA.
The particular sets of basic actions and consequences that are used in their construction
lend the states their meanings. The basic actions may be taken by a decision maker or by
someone else, provided that the outcomes are observable and can be agreed upon. For
example, running a horse race is a basic action taken by a racing organization. Taking
protective measures to reduce (the verifiable damage) from an approaching hurricane is a basic
action taken by the decision maker. In both cases one may place a bet on the observed
outcome. In the case of hurricane damage, the bet is an insurance policy.
However, if there is a unanimous agreement that some basic actions cannot possibly result
in some consequences, then there is agreement that certain states are null (e.g., if, given an act,
a, the attainment of the consequence c defies the laws of physics). Formally, for each a ∈ A,
denote by Ca the set of consequences that are feasible under a. Then the states s ∈ CA such
that, for some a ∈ A, sa ∉ Ca are null. Imposing these “feasibility constraints” allows a
parsimonious depiction of the state space as consisting of the event of all nonnull states.
Formally, the parsimonious state space is S  s : A → C ∣ sa ∈ Ca,∀a ∈ A. If the sets
of consequences that are deemed feasible under different basic actions are a matter of
subjective belief, then the null states subjective. Put differently, a state that assigns an action a
a consequence c ∉ Ca is, by definition, null insofar as a decision maker who believes that
Ca is the set of feasible consequences under a is concerned.
This definition of the state space does not preclude the existence of salient background
states. It does not contradict the idea that a tree might make noise when it falls even if there no
one is there to hear it. It does presume, however, that, insofar as decision theory is concerned
with modeling and characterizing choice behavior, such salient states are immaterial. To
paraphrase Savage, if two different states have the same consequences for every basic action,
then from the present point of view, there would be no point in considering them different
states at all. In other words, two salient states are regarded as equivalent if and only if every
basic action has equal consequences in both of them. Hence, the definition of the state space
proposed here can be regarded as a quotient state space embedded in some larger salient state
space.
Because each state assigns a unique consequence to each basic action, it constitutes, by
definition, a complete resolution of uncertainty, and the states are mutually disjoint. However,
basic actions are mutually exclusive and states are lists of counterfactuals. For example, a
patient who decides to undergo surgery at Johns Hopkins University Hospital cannot find out
what would have been the outcome if he had chosen instead to undergo the same surgery at the
Mayo Clinic. Thus, a complete resolution of uncertainty is inherently impossible. More
generally, the implementation of a basic action, a, excludes other basic actions. Hence, if an
outcome, c, is observed, then the uncertainty is only partially resolved. Only the event (that is,
a subset of S) consisting of all the states that assign the consequence c to the basic action a,
can be known to have been obtained.
Examples
The most obvious example of a state of nature is a depiction of a natural phenomenon –
tomorrow’s temperature in Baltimore, the force of the next earthquake to hit San Francisco.
These natural phenomena are perceived through measurements. Thus, the set of basic actions
consists of measurements; the set of feasible consequences are the sets of measurable values
corresponding to each measurement. If only one measurement is taken, then the state space
consists of all the possible values taken by the measurement. If several measurements of the
same phenomenon are taken, the measurements might not agree (e.g., because of inaccuracy of
the instrument or the conditions under which the measurements are taken). In this case, the
state space consists of all the configurations of values taken by the different measurements. If
measurements are taken of different phenomena, then the state space consists of the Cartesian
product of the set of the possible values of the measurements.
An important class of states of nature are an organism’s states of health. These phenomena
are perceived by direct sensations, diagnostic tests, and/or response to treatments. Presumably,
some underlying causes determine the organism’s state of health and the corresponding
symptoms. According to the approach described here, the only meaningful definition of a state
of health is its perceived symptoms (that is, the results of diagnostic tests and/or response to
treatments). In other words, recommended treatments and insurance coverage for such
treatments are based on the perceived symptoms rather than the underlying causes. The latter
are salient states.
Other prevalent class constitutes of states induced by competitive sporting events, such as
horse races. In the case of a horse race the basic actions correspond to the sets of horses that
enter the race and the set of consequences are the possible orders according to which the horses
cross the finish line. Running the race is a way of measuring the relative and/or absolute speed
of the horses, which determine the states. In this particular example, the set of states is
identical to the set of consequences. Other contests, such as presidential elections, beauty
contests, and jury trials, should also be thought of as forms of measurement. In the case of
presidential elections, for instance, the outcome of the vote is a measurement of the support for
the competing candidates and the platforms on which they run. In the case of a beauty contest
the outcome is a measurement of the opinions of the panel of judges. In the case of a jury trial,
the outcome measures the weight of the evidence in the minds of the jurors.
Savage’s omelet
To grasp the difference between the traditional approach to modeling decision making
under uncertainty and the approach advocated here, it is instructive to compare Savage’s
analysis to the analysis according to the approach of this paper of the following scenario:
Your wife has just broken five good eggs into a bowl when you come and volunteer
to finish making the omelet. A sixth egg, which for some reason must either be used
for the omelet or wasted altogether, lies unbroken beside the bowl. You must decide
what to do with this unbroken egg. Perhaps it is not too great an oversimplification to
say that you must decide among three actions only, namely, to break it into the bowl
containing the other five, to break an egg into a saucer for inspection, or to throw it
away without inspection. (Savage 1954: 13)
Savage takes the state space and the set of consequences as primitives and defines the
actions to be the functions from the set of states to the set of consequences as follows:
actions/States Good Rotten
Break into bowl Six-egg omelet c1 No omelet, five good eggsdestroyed c2
Break into saucer Six-egg omelet, a saucerto wash c3
Five-egg omelet, a saucer
to wash c4
Throw away Five-egg omelet, one good eggdestroyed c5 Five-egg omelet c6
The approach advanced here takes the sets of basic actions and feasible consequences as
primitives and constructs the state space. The basic actions are: a1 : Inspect the egg in the
bowl, a2 : Inspect the egg in the saucer, a3 : Do not inspect. The corresponding feasible
consequences are Ca1  c1,c2, Ca2  c3,c4, and, because under a3 the only
observable consequence is a five-egg omelet, or c6, the distinction between c5 and c6 not
perceivable. Consequently, Ca3  c6, and the state space is depicted in the following
matrix.
A\S s1 s2 s3 s4
a1 c1 c1 c2 c2
a2 c3 c4 c3 c4
a3 c6 c6 c6 c6
The inclusion of the states s2  c1,c4,c6 and s3  c2,c3,c6 suggests that the two forms
of inspection might yield opposite conclusions, which is possible if the inspections are subject
to error. If inspections are perfect, as is implicitly assumed in Savage’s analysis, then the states
s2 and s3 are inherently inconsistent, and the only remaining states are s1 and s4, in which the
two inspection methods agree. These states are, respectively, the good and rotten states in
Savage’s analysis. Notice, however, that according to Savage’s analysis it is the observer who
decides whether or not the inspections are perfect, and the observer’s perception determines
the state space. By contrast, according to the approach advocated here the decision maker
determines whether or not the inspections are infallible (that is, whether or not the event
E  s2, s3 is null). Consequently, the state space is conceptualized by the decision maker and
reflects his understanding of the environment.
Expansion and contraction of the state space
An important advantage of the approach taken here is the flexibility it affords in allowing
the state space to be redefined and expanded when new basic actions and/or consequences are
discovered or the understanding of the links connecting actions and consequences is modified.
Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015a, 2015b) exploited this advantage to model reverse Bayesianism
and decision makers’ anticipation of discovery of consequences that, in their current state of
ignorance, they cannot imagine and may even lack the language to describe. More specifically,
the discovery that a basic action, say a ∈ A, resulted in an unfamiliar consequence ĉ ∉ C
requires a redefinition of the state space. Formally, let Ĉ  C  ĉ, then the new, expanded
state space is ĈA. Similarly, the introduction and/or discovery of a new basic action â ∉ A, for
instance, taking an additional measurement of a natural phenomenon or the invention of a new
financial asset (e.g., options) requires the redefinition of the state space. Formally, let
Â  A  â, then the new state space is CÂ.
It is worth emphasizing that while ĈA constitutes a genuine expansion of the state space,
CA, CÂ is a refinement of CA. Put differently, the event ĈA\CA is constituted of states
sa  ĉ, for some a ∈ A, that were not part of the description of the original state space. By
contrast, if â may be associated with all the consequences in C, corresponding to each state, s,
in the original state space, CA, there is an event Es : a∈Asa  c ∣ c ∈ C in the state
space CÂ. Thus, the state space CÂ is a uniform refinement (filtration) of the original state
space CA. The sets Es, s ∈ S, described above constitute a partition of the state space CÂ.
Our approach to modelling the state space avoids pitfalls in the analysis of decision making
under uncertainty. For instance, Ahn and Ergin (2010) present a model in which the choice set
consists of acts that are measurable with respect to partitions, interpreted as alternative
descriptions of a fixed underlying state space. According to them, preference relations over
measurable acts are partition dependent. They invoke the notion of filtration (that is, a uniform
refinements of the partition of the state space) and gradual filtration (that is, a refinement of a
partition that does not split all the nonnull cells of the original partition). In terms of the
approach presented here, every basic action, a, induces a partition of the state space CA
defined by a−1c ∣ c ∈ C. Viewed in this way, the descriptions of the state space have
concrete meanings – namely, they are the consequences of the basic actions. Moreover,
filtration corresponds to refinements of the space in the wake of discovery of new basic
actions. However, gradual filtration is inconsistent with either the discovery of a new basic
action or that of new consequences. This raises the following question: How, and in what
language, is the gradual filtration described?
Subjective states and coarse contingencies
Kreps (1979, 1992) introduced the notion of subjective state space derived from
preferences over menus displaying ‘preference for flexibility.’ According to Kreps, subjective
states are resolutions of the uncertainty regarding choices from menus (that is nonempty sets of
alternatives) having the interpretation of preference relations on alternatives in the menus.
The approach of this paper can be applied to the definition of subjective state space as
follows: Analogous to the set of consequences is a finite set, F, of alternatives. Corresponding
to basic actions are nonempty subsets of F, dubbed menus. Menus are analogous to basic
actions. LetMF denote the set of all menus consisting of elements of F. By definition, the set
of alternatives in each menu is the set of feasible consequences given the basic action
represented by that menu. The subjective state space induced byMF is the set of mappings
F :  : MF → F ∣ M ∈ M,∀M ∈ MF. If alternatives are observable (that is,
agreed upon by distinct observers), then the derived state space is objective and determined
independently of the preferences of the decision maker.
In general, the states in F do not correspond to complete and transitive preference
relations and are therefore of little interest. However, suppose that there is a choice function
c : MF → MF (that is, cM ⊆ M, for all M ∈ MF that satisfies the weak axiom of
revealed preference (that is, for any pair f, f ′ ∈ F andM,M′ ∈ MF, if f, f ′ ∈ M ∩M′, f ∈ cM
and f ′ ∉ cM, then f ′ ∉ cM′). It is easy to show that if M ∈ cM then each state
correspond to a complete and transitive preference relation,  on F, and that
cM  f ∈ M ∣ f  f ′ for all f ′ ∈ M. Moreover, if f, f ′ ∈ cM ∩ cM′ for some
M,M′ ∈ MF then the preference relation corresponding to the states ,′ ∈ F such that
M  f, M′  f ′, ′M  f ′, ′M′  f and M′′  ′M′′, for all
M′′ ∈ MF\M,M′, satisfy   ′ . Hence, multiple states may be equivalent in the senseof corresponding to the same preference relation. By definition, equivalent states assign to
different menus indifferent alternatives.
This approach to defining subjective state spaces may be useful for interpreting some
results in the literature. In particular, Epstein, Marinacci and Seo (2007) present axiomatic
models based on menu choice with coarse contingencies. In their models, contingencies are
subjective states and coarse contingencies are events in this space. According to them a
decision maker might be aware of her inability to describe in detail all the contingencies that
may affect her ex post behavior (that is, choice from a menu). In terms of our definition of the
state space, coarse contingencies arise when the decision maker neglects to consider certain
menus inMF when constructing the subjective state space. Put differently, the decision maker
considers only menus in a subsetM ⊂ MF and defines the state space
   : M → F ∣ M ∈ cM,∀M ∈ M on the restricted domain. If the decision
maker knows F and hence possesses all the information necessary to construct the entire state
space, then the coarseness may be attributed to implicit cost associated with the complexity of
detailed depiction of the entire state space. The decision maker is aware of, voluntarily, acting
on the basis of incomplete articulation of the relevant alternatives to form the full set of
contingencies.
An alternative interpretation of coarseness is that the decision maker is aware of only a
proper subset of the alternatives known to the modeler. This interpretation can be related to the
effect of discovery of new alternatives. If a decision maker becomes aware of a new
alternative, f̄, then the set of menus becomesMF′ , where F ′  F  f̄. The subjective statespace induced byMF′ is F′   : MF′ → F ′ ∣ M ∈ cM,∀M ∈ MF′. Note that
F ⊂ F′ . Thus, F′ represents a refinement of the original subjective state space, as the newalternative expands the domain of the definition of states. Each state or preference relation in
F, constitutes an event in the new state space consisting of states that agree onMF and
differ in the set of subset menus M̄ ∈ MF′ ∣ M̄  M  f̄,M ∈ F. Interpreting states aspreference relations that satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference, the refinement of the
state space due to discovery of new alternatives does not affect the preference relations derived
from the menus inMF. Consequently, it has no implication for models of menu choice.
The Choice Set
Grand world, small worlds
Two different approaches can be used to model decision making under uncertainty. The
first approach envisions a framework that includes the set of all basic actions and the
corresponding feasible consequences to construct a grand state space along the lines described
above. According to this approach, decision makers entertain beliefs about the likely
realizations of the events (subsets) of this grand state space and act on these beliefs when
facing specific decisions. This approach imposes consistency of beliefs across decisions
problems.
According to the second approach, when facing specific decision problems, decision
makers construct the relevant “small world” state space by listing the relevant basic actions
and consequences and defining the relevant states to be the mapping from the set of relevant
basic actions to the set of relevant feasible consequences. This approach does not require that a
decision maker’s beliefs across decision problems be consistent.
The two approaches to formulating the decision problem are essentially the same. The
difference is the definition of the relevant primitive sets of basic actions and consequences.
Feasible and conceivable acts
Once the state space is fixed, the choice set may be defined. In Schmeidler and Wakker
(1987); Karni and Schmeidler (1991); and Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015a, 2015b), the choice
space consists of the original basic actions and the set of conceivable acts (that is, all the
mappings from the set of states to the set of feasible consequences). As Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1995) note, the cardinality of the set of conceivable acts is twice that of the basic actions.
Since subjective expected utility theory requires that decision makers be characterized with
complete preference relations on the set of conceivable acts (whereas, in practice they may
choose only among the basic actions) the preference relations in subjective expected utility
theory are inherently hypothetical. This is “a far cry from the behavioral foundations of
Savage’s original model” (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1995: 626). According to Gilboa (2009) this
is problem. “But the problem we encounter here is that the choice between elements of F (the
set of conceivable acts) cannot be observable in principle.” (Gilboa 2009: 116). The view
expressed here is different, allows the determination of subjective probabilities without
requiring the elicitation of preferences among hypothetical conceivable acts. Perhaps the best
way to illustrate this is to consider betting on the outcome of a horse race.
Taking the small world approach, suppose, for the sake of simplicity of exposition, that two
horses enter the race, Incumbent and Challenger and that there are three possible outcomes: o1
(Incumbent wins), o2 (Challenger wins), and o3 (dead heat). The relevant set of basic action is
a singleton a, “running the race between Incumbent and Challenger.” Let the set of relevant
consequences consists of the outcomes of the race, O  o1,o2,o3 and a subset I of the reals
representing monetary payoffs (that is, C  O  I). Because elements of I are not associated
with a, the set of feasible consequences associated with a is Ca  O. Hence, according to
our approach, the parsimonious state space consists of three states, S  o1,o2,o3.
Conceivable acts include all the mappings from S to O  I. Some conceivable acts are
hypothetical. For instance, the conceivable constant act whose image is o1 has the
interpretation of running a race under the condition that Challenger cannot possibly win. By
contrast, conceivable acts whose payoffs are sums of money (that is, elements of I are
feasible. They correspond to betting on the outcome of the horse race. For example, the
conceivable act that pays off x ∈ I if o1 obtains, y ∈ I if o2 obtains, and 0 otherwise, where
x  0  y, has a concrete meaning–namely, a bet on Incumbent winning the race. More
generally, the set of bets B : b : S → O  I ∣ bs ∈ I, ∀s ∈ S is a subset of the set of
conceivable acts that is feasible. The proposals of Borel (1924) and Ramsey (1926) are
naturally applicable in this setting.
In some situations, decision makers can contemplate choosing simultaneously a basic
action and a bet. Hence, the conceivable choice set,
C : a,b : S → O  I ∣ a,b ∈ A  B, where A denotes the set of relevant basic actions
and B is the corresponding set of bets, is the set of conceivable act-bet pairs that map the state
space S to the product set O  I. For example, facing the prospect of an approaching hurricane,
a decision maker may choose among basic actions, such as boarding up his house, or moving
to a shelter, to minimize the potential damage and, simultaneously, take out insurance. The
potential damages represent the observable outcomes of the basic actions and the insurance
policies are bets.
The separation of states and consequences
A crucial aspect of Savage’s (1954) model is the separation of tastes and beliefs. The
valuation of the consequences (that is, tastes) is independent of the events in which they are
affected, and the assessment of the likelihoods of events (that is, beliefs) is independent of
valuation of the consequences assigned to them. This separation is not always natural,
however, and in some important situations states and consequences are confounded and the
preference relation is not state independence.
Consider, for example, the following situation, described by Aumann in a letter to Savage
dated January 1971. A man’s love for his wife makes his life without her “less ‘worth living.’”
The wife falls ill. To survive, she must undergo a routine but dangerous operation. The
husband is offered a choice between betting $100 on his wife’s survival or on the outcome of a
coin flip. Even supposing that the husband believes that his wife has an even chance of
surviving the operation, he may still rather bet on her survival, because winning $100 if she
does not survive is “somehow worthless.” Betting on the outcome of a coin flip, the husband
might win but not be able to enjoy his winnings because his wife dies. In this situation, argues
Aumann, Savage’s notion of states (that is, whether the wife is dead or alive) and
consequences are confounded to the point that there is nothing that one may call a consequence
(that is, something whose value is state independent).
In his response, Savage admits that the difficulty Aumann identifies is indeed serious. In
defense of his model, Savage writes, “The theory of personal probability and utility is, as I see
it, a sort of framework into which I hope to fit a large class of decision problems. In this
process, a certain amount of pushing, pulling, and departure from common sense may be
acceptable and even advisable.... To some–perhaps to you–it will seem grotesque if I say that I
should not mind being hung so long as it be done without damage to my health or reputation,
but I think it desirable to adopt such language so that the danger of being hung can be
contemplated in this framework” (Drèze 1987: 78). To the specific example of Aumann,
Savage responds, “In particular, I can contemplate the possibility that the lady dies medically
and yet is restored in good health to her husband” (Drèze 1987: 80).The presumption that
decision makers engage in such mental exercises when making decisions seems farfetched.
The source of the problem is the formulation of the state space. Both Aumann and Savage
take for granted that there are two states, the wife lives and the wife dies. However, because
the wife’s death affects the husband’s well-being, it is also a consequence. It is the double role
of the wife’s health that confounds states and consequences. This problem can be avoided if
the states space is defined using the approach outlined above.
In the scenario described by Aumann, there are two basic actions (undergo surgery, a1, and
avoid surgery, a2 and two feasible consequences (the wife lives, c1, and the wife dies, c2.
(Note that Ca1  Ca2  c1,c2.) They generate four states:
A\S s1 s2 s3 s4
a1 c1 c1 c2 c2
a2 c1 c2 c1 c2
If the husband believes that if his wife is to survive she must undergo the operation (that is, the
husband believes that a2 must necessarily result in c2) then for him the event s1, s3 is null.
In this context, the constant act that yields the outcome “the wife lives,” c1, in every state
amounts to conceiving a medical procedure, not currently available, that is guaranteed to save
the wife’s life. Denote this conceivable treatment by a3 and suppose that Ca3  c1.
Augmenting the depiction of the states by adding the consequence of this conceivable constant
act yields s2  c1,c2,c1 and s4  c2,c2,c1. The state s4 is a description of a situation in
which the wife would die under all currently available treatments but not under treatment a3.
Savage’s statement “I can contemplate the possibility that the lady dies medically and yet is
restored in good health to her husband” is problematic, because if the outcome “the wife dies
during the operation” is a state of nature, then the constant act that delivers the consequence c1
(the wife lives) must be possible in the state in which she is dead, which is absurd. However,
according to the approach advanced here, the same statement translates into “I can contemplate
the possibility of a treatment that would restore the wife in good health to her husband in
circumstance in which she would have died under the currently available treatments.” This
statement, far from being absurd, is quite conceivable.
Consider next the husband’s betting decision. The availability of a coin flip, f, introduces
another basic action and two new feasible consequences, “heads up” (denoted H) and “tails
up” (denoted T). Betting also requires monetary payoffs. For simplicity assume that the set of
monetary payoffs is a doubletonM  $0,$100. This modification requires the expansion of
the state space. Since Cf  H,T, the relevant set of consequences is
C  Ca1  Ca2  Cf M. Since M and Ca1  Ca2  Cf are disjoint, the
parsimonious state space consists of four states: s2H  c1,c2,H, s2T  c1,c2,T,
s4H  c2,c2,H and s4T  c2,c2,T.
Bets are conceivable acts: “bet on heads” (denoted b1) and “bet on tails” (denoted b2). The
bet b1 pays off $100 in the event H : s2H, s4H and $0 in the event T : s2T, s4T. A bet on
the survival of the wife, b3, pays off $100 in the event E2 : s2H, s2T and $0 in the event
E4 : s4H, s4T. In other words, betting on the wife’s survival is betting that the operation
succeeds. Since the husband’s evaluation of the monetary payoff is not independent of whether
the wife is dead or alive, according to the traditional approach, the preference relation does not
satisfy state independence. By contrast, under the approach advanced here the husband can
contemplate such a bet even if he does not choose a1. For example, the husband can conceive
of choosing simultaneously the imaginary treatment a3 and the aforementioned bet. If the
husband imagines choosing a3,b1 ∈ A ′  B, then the consequences that would have followed
are the payoff c1, $100 in the event H and the payoff c1, $0 in the event T. Similarly,
imagining choosing a3,b3 would pay off c1, $100 in the event E2 and c1, $0 in the event
E4. Thus, the consequences of both bets are identical. Therefore, if the husband is an expected
utility maximizer and believes that an operation has an equal chance of succeeding or failing,
he is indifferent between betting on the outcome of the coin flip and betting on the success of
the operation. Thus, the approach to the construction of the state space advanced here
disentangles states and consequences and lends credence to the supposition that the preferences
display state independence.
However, the elicitation of the husband’s beliefs is a thought experiment whose outcome
hinges on a bet the payoff of which depends on the outcome of the act a1 when a3 is supposed
to be implemented. If the implementation of the imaginary medical treatment a3 precludes the
implementation of a1, then the scenario described above is inherently hypothetical, hence such
a bet cannot possibly be settled in practice. The conclusion requires the admission of
preferences over hypothetical choices expressed verbally admitting preferences over
counterfactuals. This departure from the revealed preference methodology raises
methodological issues that cannot be addressed here. I conclude, therefore, by restating
Savage’s position on this issue: “There is a mode of interrogation between what I called the
behavioral and the direct. One can, namely, ask the person, not how he feels but what he would
do in such and such situation. In so far as the theory of decision under development is regarded
as an empirical one, the intermediate mode is a compromise between economy and rigor. But
in the theory’s more normative interpretation as a set of criteria of consistency for us to apply
to our decisions, the intermediate mode is just the right one” (Savage 1954: 28).
Concluding Remarks
This paper presents an approach to modeling states of nature as functions from a set of
basic actions to feasible consequences and examines its implications for the specification of
the choice set in the theory of decision making under uncertainty. The key idea is that the
events (subsets of the state space) must be verifiable so that bets placed on the realization of
events can be settled. The advantage of this approach is illustrated by examples of pitfalls its
adoption helps sidestep and the flexibility it affords in expanding and refining the state space
in the wake of discovery of new consequences and/or basic actions.
According to this approach, insofar as choice-based decision theory is concerned, events
such as ‘it will rain tomorrow in Baltimore’ or ‘Incumbent wins the horse race’ are defined by
their manifested effects. These effects include, in the former instance, the measured quantity of
rainfall in Baltimore tomorrow and, in the latter instance, Incumbent being the first horse to
cross the finish line. The subjective probabilities of these events can be readily inferred from
the odds a decision maker is willing to offer when betting on these events, depicted by the
aforementioned measurements and/or observations, or by applying one of the procedures for
probability elicitation (e.g., Karni 2009) to these measurement.
One-time events are extreme examples of a dynamic outlook expressed in the dictum of
Heraclitus of Ephesus “No man ever steps in the same river twice.” The idea of measuring the
degree of belief in the likely realization of such events by subjective probabilities might seem
to defy the scientific exigencies of revisiting the same event repeatedly under similar, if not
identical, conditions. This observation raises concerns regarding the appropriateness of
invoking the notion of a state space in a theory dealing with choice behavior in the face of
one-time events.
At one extreme, defining the state-space as sequences of repeated measurements of natural
phenomenon, such as the temperature at a given place during the same day every year,
corresponds to the scientific notion of repeated observations under the similar conditions.
Assessing probabilities on such states comes close to calculating relative frequencies, which
has the flavor of objectivity. At the other extreme, the issue becomes problematic when the
states space corresponds to the possible outcomes of the next presidential election in the
United States, as measured by the vote of the electoral college. This is a one-time event that,
by definition, does not allow for repeated observations under similar conditions. Nevertheless,
when facing investment decisions whose consequences are contingent on who is the next
president of the United States, decision makers must evaluate the alternative courses of action
based on their degree of belief in outcome of the presidential election.
Arguably, the analytical framework described here is more readily applicable to the case of
repeated measurements than to the modeling of the uncertainty associated with one-time
events. Yet it is not only conceivable but actually possible to bet on the outcome of the next
US presidential elections in the same way one bets on the outcome of the roll of a die. The
odds offered allows an assessment of the subjective probabilities of the underlying events.
These personal assessments need not converge. Nevertheless, the procedure is not
scientifically vacuous. First, if the behavioral underpinnings, depicted by the axioms, are
common in many decisions, one may still use the theory to make predictions. Second, the
elicited personal beliefs, using well-established procedures, can be confronted with the odds a
decision maker is ready to offer when betting on a particular one-time event, thus providing a
test of the consistency of choice behavior governed by beliefs. Third, combining the elicited
probabilities with updating rules (e.g., Bayes rule), the theory may be tested by the validity of
its predictions of choice behavior contingent on the acquisition of new information.
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